# AI Market Shifts: Anthropic Leak, OpenAI Pivot, and Valuation Risks

**Podcast:** The Twenty Minute VC (20VC): Venture Capital | Startup Funding | The Pitch
**Published:** 2026-04-02

## Transcript

We may be at the stage where we throw the humans under the bus, not the AI anymore, which I think at some level is pretty terrifying.
I think shooting in the head is even more significant.
A big part of the whole strategic direction of the company was flawed.
You're seeing the economists, the accountants have wandered into the room and they said, we have a scarce resource here.
Let's optimize it.
Let's devote this compute to the people who can pay the most for it.
You haven't lived till you've seen an 85% decline in an index.
This is one where it's just back-ass backwards.
And I don't believe there's right or wrong in money.
There's just money.
I just don't think raising at $5 or $8 billion when you're at $80 million or $100 million of suspect ARR is the most exciting accomplishment in the world.
Let me be direct.
Get the fuck over it.
You should conform your company around your customers and your model, not your VCs.
Being mean to a billionaire is actually a feature.
This is 20VC with me, Harry Stebbings, and it's my favorite show of the week.
Rory O'Driscoll, Jason Lemkin, analyzing the biggest news in tech.
So we start with Anthropik's Monster Week.
We move to OpenAI, killing Sora and hitting 100 million ARR on ads.
And then we finish on the man with the biggest balls in tech, Massa, getting $40 billion loan to buy more OpenAI stock for SoftBank.
But before we dive into the show today, I run 20VC Fund and I get this question from founders all the time.
Harry, I can't find a good .com.
Do you have a hookup?
Let me tell you now, the answer is always going to be no.
I don't have a guy or gal for that.
I do have a recommendation though.
If you're building a tech startup, get a .tech domain.
Techstartup.techdomain.
It couldn't be more simple or obvious.
As an investor, I appreciate founders who put thought into their branding.
When I see .tech in your name, it tells me right away that tech is at the core of your build.
It'll say that to your customers, too.
A clean and sharp domain like .tech pays off in the long run.
Look at the companies using .tech.
Nothing.tech, 1x.tech, Aurora.tech, CES.tech, Ultra.tech, Alice.tech, Neon.tech, Blaze.tech, Pi.tech.
Great tech companies.
They all use...
the .tech domain.
These are my two cents.
If you're building a tech startup, don't overthink it.
Secure your .tech domain from any registrar of your choice.
While .tech gives modern companies a home online, Checkout helps that home convert by turning traffic into revenue.
Over the past 15 years, Guillem-Pozaz has led Checkout.com through what he calls the velocity years, a period of hyper-growth with relentless product building.
The lesson?
High growth is a gift, but it demands ruthless focus.
As his mother put it, play the game you're good at.
For Checkout.com, that game is digital payments, obsessing over data, chasing basis points, and compounding learnings over time.
And that discipline is paying off.
2025, Checkout.com processed over $300 billion in total volume, up 64% year-over-year, and returned to full-year EBITDA profitability.
They now support over 1,000 enterprise merchants globally, including 63 that process more than a billion annually, with brands like eBay, Vinted, Amex, ASOS, and Tmoo.
Guillaume's message, though, it's pretty clear.
They've earned the right to win anywhere.
Now, they're investing in innovation across marketplaces, issuing, financial experiences, and agentic commerce.
If you want payments built...
for what's next talk to the team at checkout.com that's checkout.com while checkout powers the moment money changes hands invisible powers the people behind the work why don't we hear more real ai success stories from big companies the models are insanely good but implementation is the problem it's really really hard there's data all over the place there's legacy tech and manual workarounds it's a ferrari engine in a shopping cart meet invisible invisible trains 80 of the top models and then adapts them to the messy reality of your business take the charlotte horners nba team invisible took years of game tape and analog scouting notes to go from uncertainty to a draft pick and Summer League Championship win in weeks, not seasons.
Get the data in order first, and suddenly AI can do almost anything for you in the enterprise.
If you want AI that hits the P&L, go to invisibletech.ai forward slash 20VC.
You have now arrived at your destination.
Boys, welcome back.
It is this week in Anthropic, otherwise known as the Sassogees, which has been renamed.
I want to start with, you guessed it, Anthropic.
Unbelievable 28-day month of February, where they did $6 billion in revenue, which was more...
than Databricks has done in their entire lifetime.
Do you know what I think was the most interesting news out of Anthropic this week?
It was actually the accidental leak of Claude Mythos, essentially 3,000 unpublished assets leaked.
It's a 10 trillion parameter model, apparently, that is this next level step changing capabilities that they're not releasing because of how powerful it is.
This is by far the most interesting to me.
Jason, how did you think about this news?
Well, look, obviously it's embarrassing, right, to Anthropic to leak it.
I actually just think we're going to see more and more of this accelerate.
The faster we vibe code, the faster we ship, the more corners we cut in general.
on application level security.
It happens.
I mean, so many folks are accidentally uploading code to insecure GitHub, to database, to super bases that are by default open.
So this is accelerating our data, which is just open on the internet.
And you could say, God, this shouldn't happen at the anthropic level.
And I'm sure someone will get scolded.
But overall, this is accelerating.
And it's going to accelerate even more as we let our AI agents make decisions.
Our agents are going to decide where to put code.
They're going to decide what level of security to use.
This is going to become happenstance.
And people were like, oh, how could Anthropic have a new security agent and have this happen at the same time?
I think it makes perfect sense.
The Anthropic AI security agents, which I've basically used in REP, it's very, very good.
And it also makes sense as we rush.
We're going to leak source code, data, PII, right?
I don't know whether it's happened.
It was reported today.
All of Merkur's data leaked.
It's being held hostage, all of it, every single interview, every single piece of PII, every single piece of humans.
And so, you know, we used to mock these.
I think it's going to start happening daily and weekly in the agentic era.
And it doesn't excuse it, but it's a reality.
Agents are goal-seeking and agents are going to make, not only are they going to make the same mistake as humans, they're going to work a thousand times faster.
So even if they make the mistakes 10% as often, Rory, help me with the math.
If they do a thousand times more productive, they're still going to make a hundred times more mistakes.
We're going to see it everywhere.
We're going to see it everywhere.
So again, just for perspective, because there's two things going on here.
Some data leaked from Antropic about their new model mythos, which of itself is meant to be amazingly powerful in dealing with cybersecurity.
And there was a whole consequence that we'll talk about in a second in terms of how that impacted cybersecurity stocks.
But as Jason pointed out, the level of irony here is acute because it was an inadvertent leak.
So you had the situation where a model that's meant to be amazing for cybersecurity actually leaked via cybersecurity leak.
So we're toggling between the two.
On the cybersecurity leak, it was nose-worded and tropic quote-unquote blamed human error.
We may be at the stage where we throw the humans under the bus, not the AI anymore, which I think at some level is pretty terrifying.
And you know exactly what happened.
You often see this where you're about to do a big announcement, you have your content management system, you stage all the assets, be it their Fed press release.
In the UK, it happened on the budget, if you remember, Harry.
You have the press release ready to hit play the minute the budget has ended and someone inadvertently forgets and put it on the public side in advance.
It's the same thing here.
So it probably was a human error.
There's a whole bunch of content ready for, I don't know, pick a date, the March, the May 15th announcement of Mythos.
They forget to secure it correctly and out it goes.
So that's the first thing, right?
So that's the embarrassing part of it.
And then the interesting part of it, and you really do have to do this without sniggering, despite the fact that it all leaked, you also have to separately talk about the fact.
There's some big claims on mythos, right?
And on Tropic, we're making via, again, via this leaked memo.
Reminder, no one else has seen it.
The actual model, I think it's not publicly available.
Obviously, some people have seen it, but not publicly available.
And even I was trying to get copies of the leaked memo.
There's just a few screenshots at this stage.
It's hard to track it down.
But the statement is, it's way more powerful.
Second thing is it's going to be way more expensive for them to serve, and therefore it's going to be way more expensive for customers to buy.
And then the third thing is a particular focus on cybersecurity.
It's meant to be, quote, unquote, extremely good at detecting cyber issues.
And the result of that was a 4% or 5% decline in the average cybersecurity stock last Friday when this leak happened.
Yeah, maybe just two other things on the league, just for this trade-off.
You know, I'm dating myself, but when I was at Adobe and we were acquired, we were an early customer of GitHub.
And so we were putting source code in the cloud.
And that was banned at Adobe at the time.
It was banned because the source code was their crown jewel.
It was pretty easy to make a crappy PDF reader or a crappy image generator.
But to do what Photoshop or Adobe Acrobat did, all the exceptions, all the tens of thousands of corner cases was the crown jewel, right, of the company.
And so everything, we got the first exemption to be able to use source code in the cloud and pros and cons.
But when they use this on-prem source code management tool, it took a month to do a release, a month.
Okay, now we're doing 60 releases a day, right?
Or even Anthropic, fastest growing enterprise company of all time is still doing massive releases every month or two and dropping features every day, right?
So we went to something that took 30 days at a tech leader to something that takes hours.
There's trade, there's trade ops there and I'll take them, but we're going to see it explode.
In terms of like the stuff that was published today, going back a few threads on show number 50 to Rory, one of the things that I thought was pretty cool in Kairos was two things.
Always-on background assistant that works constantly.
Our AI is working with us 24-7.
And agents that can sleep, wake, and self-resume without any prompt.
The autonomous agents, which I've been talking about how this is going to consume orders of magnitude more tokens and change our life.
I'm excited to see more is coming.
And, you know, Open Claw was just this brief thing that woke us up to what Anthropic appears to be all in on, right?
Truly autonomous agents running 24-7.
Hopefully, safely, hopefully not leaking all of our source code, but it's coming soon, right?
Not these, you know, this whole idea that we've been doing.
When we started this podcast, you went on to ChatGPT or Claude.
No one had heard of Claude when we started this.
I was a quirky guy using Claude.
And you talk to it and go back the next day.
The next release, it's going to be on all the time.
Debating Harry's latest investment.
Was it big enough?
Is he too concentrated in the fund?
Where should he go?
What was Rory thinking on that deal, right?
Why was Rory abusing Harry by email again for the second time in a day?
But this is the future.
I'm excited to see it coming sooner when our agents are 24-7.
Like they're literally around us and we give up all of our personal freedoms and autonomy as part of it.
I hear you on the embarrassment of it being leaked and, you know, the human error element.
But while...
Anthropic has mythos, which is supposedly as powerful as it is.
You're juxtaposing that with open AI fucking around with killing Sora, kind of ads not really working and people being unhappy with it.
And it's seeming like this massive chasm of the progression of force that is Dario and Anthropic continuing faster and harder than ever with a faltering, confused and dazed open AI wandering around the product desert trying to find some water.
You're just being mean.
I mean, again, as I said last, and I'm sorry to repeat.
Is that not fair?
Yeah.
Again, narrative is overdone on both sides.
I think some parts of it are true.
Obviously, you're true in a bunch of different things.
The decision to shoot Sora in the head, almost certainly a good decision.
Look, it's obviously embarrassing to say something is going to be amazing less than four or five months ago and then shoot it in the head.
But if it's a mistake, give him credit for at least saying it's a mistake.
Move on.
And yeah, that relationship with Disney, again, I think it wasn't me.
I was sneering at it on real time when it happened.
I think someone else in this podcast said it's really significant.
Just saying.
I think it's massively significant.
I think shooting it in the head is even more significant.
I think it's saying that a big part of the whole strategic direction of the company was flawed.
Agreed.
The whole that we are going all in on consumer.
From what I read, Soro made single digit millions of revenue, right?
And was consuming a million a week, which actually sounds way too low, right?
It must have consumed billions and made single digit millions.
It makes no sense as a product, either in the short term or long term.
But if you want to own the whole consumer experience with AI, they decided we have to own image and video and Anthropic never even attempted to do it, right?
So it's a massive retreat.
It's probably the right decision to your point.
In fact, almost certainly is.
But man.
That's our strategy was wrong.
Like this is a huge own goal.
Our strategy was wrong.
And I agree with that.
But I still think, as I say, I still think Harry's kind of overagging it a little bit because, look, you made a comment about ads that I think is effectively implying that the ad strategy hasn't worked.
That's a bit of a.
a bigger leap.
I mean, Sora hasn't worked.
They've killed it.
I think I'm with Jason.
I think that's smart because I think one of the things you're seeing right now is in a world of scarce compute and astonishingly, despite all the investments that we've seen in terms of actual available compute for people to sell AI on, we're in a scarcity mode.
You don't devote compute to things that are highly compute intensive and low revenue intensive.
And Sora was almost the definition of that.
Video generation is extraordinarily compute intensive, relatively speaking, and the revenue is almost minuscule.
Conversely, Cogen, while it is compute intensive, is orders of magnitude less compute intensive, and there's real dollars attached to it.
What's happening right now, I actually think at a higher level, it's actually very healthy.
You're seeing the economists, the accountants have wandered into the room and they said, we have a scarce resource here.
Let's optimize it.
Let's devote this compute to the people who can pay the most for it.
So that's the Sora comment.
On the ads comment, Harry, it's early days for ChatGPT ads.
But again, I cite that quote that Brian Kim did that I thought was really good.
Of course, they're going to run damn ads because there's no other way to build a mass consumer business and they've no choice.
Because their consumer conversion rates run roughly 5%.
It gets them to, I think, a roughly $10, $15 billion consumer business out of their 500 million uniques or whatever it is.
So one of two things has to happen in the consumer business.
Again, I'm going to leave the enterprise business out.
On a consumer business, either A, they take that conversion rate.
to a number we've never seen before from a typical consumer business.
I think that's unlikely.
I don't think most consumers are going to pay $20 a month for this.
Or option B is you make an ad business work.
They've got no choice to make it work.
And by working, I don't mean $100 million.
People are kind of ragging on the $100 million.
It's in the noise.
It's scale.
Big picture here, Facebook and Google each do $200 billion plus or minus a year in digital ads.
If these guys aren't doing $20 billion, Within a couple of years, they're not even in the game.
And to get to the market cap of...
Remember, Facebook has a 1.7 trillion market cap doing 200 billion.
Alphabet slash Google has a 3 trillion market cap doing 260 billion plus thing.
If they're going to grow into the market cap on the consumer side, 20 billion is not enough.
They have to do 50 billion, 70 billion of ads.
So unlike Sora, this is not going to be a try the ads and then fold.
This is a...
There's only two existential bets for this company.
One of them is ads to make the consumer business work.
And then the other is, oh, my God, we should have done coding all along.
Let's get a competitive coding and enterprise model out there and compete with Entropic on that side.
Those are the only two things they're doing, and they're the only two things they should be doing.
Straightforward.
I mean, I actually see this as good news.
At least we've gone from the let's wander around the woods feeling cool building shit to there's only two things to do.
Let's get them done.
And then it's a positive.
Better late than never.
Man, they had the Wall Street Journal this week.
They had a story of why Dario left OpenAI.
Did you read the story?
Yes, I did.
The amount of tension at OpenAI, the fact that Greg Brockman recruited them and no one would work for him.
He and his sister would not.
work for Greg Bachman, would not talk to him, that would not allow him to be part of the LLM or GTP groups.
Then Sam had to constantly tell each of them that they were in charge.
Told Dario he was the boss.
Then told Ilya and Greg they could fire him at any time if they wanted to fire Sam.
Then begging Dario to come back.
Then Dario saying he would stay only if he directly reported to the board and nobody else.
I mean, and then firing Sam and then bringing him back and then Sora and de-Sora and we're not doing coding.
It's just, I mean, I'm exhausted.
Maybe I'm wrong.
I have to think at least someone like me would feel much more comfortable and anthropic where it appears there's a much more consistent process and leadership.
Same founders, same thing, same goals.
I have to think a company organized like that's just going to out-execute someone with that level of drama.
I almost can't take it.
You're going to kill me for this, Rory.
Is the best thing for OpenAI not to buy Sierra, incorporate that as a customer support product, and have Brett Taylor come in as the day-to-day CEO?
And Sam can be fundraiser.
Sam can be master of art.
Look, I'm not in the boardroom.
Look, at the end of the day, At the end of the day, I think you're right, Harry, and I would favor that as a board member, but I'm not going to say that publicly because I don't want Sam to break my balls.
I am too unimportant for Sam to even give a shit about, right?
So I don't worry about that at all.
So let me say this delicately, that amount of board level and senior team level turnover over an extended period of time is probably the highest warning signal that you could have as a board member about how your CEO is doing.
Let's put it that safe.
Has anyone got a founder?
led company and this level of drama was going on, you're probably sitting down with the CEO and asking, how's it going at least?
And what are you thinking of doing about this?
I don't think you turn on people just when things go to shit, but you probably want to cut down the drama from here, build a team and try and call a shot and play it for more than six months at a time.
When you've worked at or observed startups where the CEO is spending so much of their time load balancing talent that can't work together versus when you've worked at one or with one where the talent's growing in the same direction, to say that it's night and day would be an understatement, right?
It's like the backside of Pluto and the front side of Mercury.
And I think Sam, we can criticize him.
Actually, when I read the...
Everything I've seen, and then when I read the Wall Street Journal, it's like, my God, this guy has spent so much time load balancing the drama of these extremely brilliant personalities.
It's just, oh my God, that can consume most of your time as CEO.
You're exactly right.
It is the drama of we're not dealing with a bunch of people just trying to crank out some B2B software and make a paycheck.
We're dealing with people who are angsting about whether this is going to change the world, who have fears about the technology, who have desires to be seen as credited for the technology despite their fears about it.
I mean, as is often the case, extraordinarily talented people come on an extraordinarily high bandwidth demand on attention and care and feeding.
It's been a real slog, I'd say.
Okay.
The man with the most balls in investing, Massa Sun.
SoftBank gets $40 billion bridge loan to buy OpenAI stock.
How deep can Massa go?
He'll go as deep as they let him.
I mean, that's the one thing we know.
If they give him another 20, he'll borrow that too.
I checked the SoftBank.
You've got SoftBank Holdings.
I have to be careful.
There's the Telco Group, which is reasonably levered at the Japan level.
And then SoftBank Group, it's around 2x levered, right?
One and a half to 2x levered in terms of equity.
What that means is a 30%, 40% decline wipes them out.
It's a very aggressive stance.
It would be like me taking our $800 million venture, $900 million venture fund, borrowing $1.8 billion.
and investing at all.
And if it works, I really juice my return.
But if it goes wrong by 30%, I'm done, right?
And it's super aggressive.
I mean, I suppose his lesson is Masa survived 2002 when I remind everyone the Nasdaq went down 85%.
You haven't lived till you've seen an 85% decline in an index.
And obviously, if that happened or anything like it, you'd just be way underwater.
It's a fairly high amount of leverage for an investment fund, to say the least.
Yeah, I mean, for sure, it's dramatic.
Having said that, you know, real estate investment funds get the maximum leverage they can by design, right?
That is how they work.
I would imagine if venture had access to more debt, we'd all load up on it.
If we all could do the growth rounds in your hottest company, maybe we could get all the carry from it.
And the worst thing is we leave the keys to fund seven on the table.
We might load up too.
I'm not sure.
But certainly real estate funds load up as much as they can.
But just pushing back again, because real estate funds load up because the cash flows are predictable.
But they can.
Because the cash flows are predictable, they can load up.
Agreed.
Right.
It's just harder for my little fund to go to Silicon Valley Bank and borrow 200 million against the- In the continuum of risk, I would argue the SoftBank portfolio, not the telecom company at the subsidiary level, but I would argue the SoftBank portfolio is more like Jason's fund than it is a real estate fund.
So I think it's a high level of risk.
Well, Plessy, what did he lose on WeWork?
12 billion?
He knows what it's like.
Look, the two big assets from memory are obviously the open AI position and I think the arm position, which I still think is in- in the holding company.
Amazing companies, world-class companies, easily imaginable.
I've bought them with a client 30%.
It's a hell of a way to live.
Speaking of declining 30% and being in the hole, we touched on it earlier, but obviously Mythos leak hammered cyber stocks.
Crowdstrike, Palo Alto, Zscaler all down 6%, Octon, Netscope down 7%, Tenable down 9%.
Was this a justified dip or...
Is this an unjust reaction to anthropic news?
I'm going to say it's not a justified dip.
And I was listening to the names and there's different aspects of security.
And some of them I can say, yeah, maybe that overlaps.
And then some of them I go, that's just a different thing.
And when you listen to all the names being thrown out, you say that's just baby with the bathwater.
Because step back.
How does Antropic make security better?
At the code development stage, they can look at code and find security flaws.
So there are companies that upfront do something like that and application security companies.
And you could argue that this is a different way of doing that.
Maybe some of those guys will be impacted.
What they're not doing, for example, is real-time perimeter defense.
They're not in a real-time basis blocking people like a firewall.
Nor are they doing what, for example, Okta does, right, which is single sign-on and authentication.
That's simply not what they do.
It's a different thing.
And the fact that those kind of stocks sold off says it's just a kind of knee-jerk reaction rather than anything thought true.
It will have an impact.
If you were doing application security or security code review...
You're probably going to have to either incorporate how this works in your analysis or you'll be redundant, just as GitHub had to roll in complete models and figure out how to adopt it.
So for some of them, this is really going to matter.
And then for others, it's just a different thing.
Stepping back, I think we're in the panicky stage.
I think we're in the stage of because these companies are doing so well, because they're private, no one sees the numbers, because AI is so sexy and so potentially amazing, we're at the stage now where anything can cause a panic.
Robinhood was down like 10% because Elon didn't potentially give them the tender and was going straight through E-Trades.
And that alone was like a massive hit for them.
Obviously, there's a panic in the market.
And the question is, is the panic justified, right?
The panic is that this revenue is not durable, right?
That's the panic.
The cybersecurity one's really interesting.
In my experience and opinion, this is one where it's just back-ass backwards.
If you're in the agentic world, this is the golden age of security.
The number of security threats and issues is going up orders of magnitude.
Cloud leaking its source code, it doesn't matter.
The number of apps exploded.
Like there's so many mobile apps that App Store is like, it's like a month to get your app reviewed versus a week.
It is, everything is exploding.
These apps are being built by agents.
They're being built in unpredictable ways.
Folks aren't looking at the code.
The pace of features being shipped, products being shipped, corners being cut.
This is- golden age of taking any mature category and acknowledging good news for us.
There's more threats.
I don't care whether it's application level, perimeter.
The good news is threats are exploding.
The whole shtick in my whole lifetime has been you've got to constantly buy new products because new threats keep emerging.
There's been a golden goose of cybersecurity that has allowed new entrants to come into a conservative category.
Someone like Wiz will show up and say, guys, we know how to do this on the web.
And people are so terrified of new threats, they'll take the meeting, right?
This should be the golden age.
for new and existing investors because the threats are terrifying and you can't stop the rogue engineers that vibe coded something that accessed your data.
This should benefit everybody.
Like everyone should be a rocket ship, like everybody monetizing GPUs is a rocket ship.
And the fact that the market doesn't see it shows, in my opinion, we're in a true panic, which is hard to predict a bottom.
It's hard, but I don't get it.
Everyone should be benefiting when you see an explosion.
in application production and a change in the paradigm.
The change in the paradigm is good for everybody except Windows Defender from 1996.
It probably doesn't help that product or whatever the hell they have, but everyone with engineers should benefit.
I broadly agree with Jason.
I mean, there are more than Windows Defender 2006 that might be impacted.
As I say, some of the application security code review stuff could be, but big picture, Jason's right.
Instead of having people trying to get into your firewall, everyone is now downloading an agent, giving it full root access to their computer and telling it, have a go.
And as Jason just pointed out, work overnight.
It's funny.
My colleague, Harold, who does a lot in the security, we've been looking at a lot of these companies.
No one yet knows the exact approach that we're going to have to take to defend against agents running within the organization.
But everyone 100% understands that this is an emerging mega threat because of the velocity adoption times the power of the solution.
So I agree with Jason.
It mightn't be...
the old guard that takes advantage of it.
I mean, one of the things I admire about the security companies is the CrowdStrikes, the Palo Alto networks of this world is they know damn fine that when a new threat emerges and a new solution emerges for that threat, when an earlier winner comes out, you better spend your 300 million bucks, your 500 million bucks and just swoop up the winner and add it to your product.
So I think there'll be a ton of fast acquisitions as agent security solutions emerge, you know, and people will be doing if they're smart.
I think those two companies are extraordinarily smart.
They'll be doing acquisitions long before it's, quote, certain, because you're going to have CIOs come and talking to you.
One thing we're mentioning on that is it was interesting.
Again, somebody leaked information from Anthropic.
They're masters at selling fear.
One of the things they're doing is they're releasing the Mythos model first to CISOs.
within companies.
It's kind of like, oh, it's so scary.
We're going to give you this model and give you time to figure out how to use it.
Of course, part of that time will involve giving a million bucks to Anthropic.
So it's just great marketing.
So they're actually leaning into that and saying to the CISOs, you're going to have to figure this out.
This is the new terrifying weapon we've invented.
Please give us a million dollars and we'll let you defend yourself with it also.
Great marketing.
But it speaks to how correctly afraid every security CISO should be.
given the pace of agentic AI adoption of the enterprise.
The golden age of cyber.
It should be.
How hard is it to get a meeting?
Whoever you are, if you have any established brand, we've got a new agentic product.
We're going to help protect you from this.
You're going to get a meeting that afternoon.
Wish I bought them over Figma.
That's a depressing chart that I'm looking at.
You need to let go, Howie.
You need to let go.
I'm down 30% in a month, Rory.
It's hard to let go after 30% in a month.
Okay.
No crying in the casino.
Move on.
I do want to discuss revenue kind of questionability.
We've got Anthropic recognizing revenue in a very different way to open AI.
And then you also have questionability around emergent labs.
And is it okay if ARR is kind of questionable in sorts of how it's accounted for?
How do we think about that?
You can choose which one you want to take.
Let me just, can I just, maybe Rory can dig into it, but I'll tell you there's one startup I invested in that's over a hundred million ARR.
I own just enough to get the investor updates.
It's not, I'm not on the board and I get three numbers every month, three revenue numbers.
I don't know what the hell they are over a hundred million, but the smallest one is ARR.
Now, I invested in seed.
I don't really care.
I'm in the money.
I don't have a choice.
But I can't understand.
This company is doing great.
But I can't understand.
For the life of me, I cannot understand these three numbers.
And there's asterisks and daggers and there's charts that go everywhere.
But they keep going up and to the right, which I think was on this emerging thing we could talk about our next.
I think that's what some of the investors said.
Who cares?
But I can't tell the hell the difference what an ARR is in 2026.
What I always get is like pipe, which is complete bullshit.
Contracted.
And then there's live.
So first of all, stepping back, to be fair about Entropic and OpenAI, they have a very clear and sensible way they define ARR.
What they say is they take the average of the last four weeks to smooth out times 13, because there are 13 four-week periods in a year, which is more sensible than monthly because you have these varying months.
So basically, what they're saying is realized revenue for the last four weeks averaged.
The average of the last four weeks times 30, obviously if it's the average, it's times 52, but basically it's actual gap revenue.
What did we bill for the average calculator that cost the last four weeks to take into account how it is?
That's their run rate.
To be fair to them, it's not committed to any of the bullshit kind of higher level stuff.
It's actual money flowing through the system.
Antropic is roughly at 19 billion according based on that kind of trailing four week metric.
And OpenAI is around 25.
But now let's talk about your thing.
There was this kind of whole meme of OpenAI reports net on their partner revenue and Entropic reports gross.
And what they're saying there is if OpenAI sells through Microsoft and Microsoft takes some money off the top, OpenAI only reports the net amount.
If Entropic sells through AWS and they sell $100 worth of revenue, they report the gross amount.
And then they give $20 back to Amazon as a cost of sale.
So there's two different methods for what look like the same revenue kind of mix, same revenue approach.
I thought you were going to extend that.
I thought part of where you're going was to Michael Cannon Brooks point on the show was that.
A lot of this revenue is getting double or triple counted because of how it's being recognized.
And not only does this happen, then Cursor is selling it again and recognizing the revenue, right?
People keep reselling these tokens again and again and recognizing them as their own ARR.
How many times do we get to resell these poor little tokens?
I think that's actually a great point, Jason.
I hadn't got to, but you're exactly right.
No, it's like everyone's got amazing revenue growth because it's the same little token going, I just can picture this little token.
I mean, if we all agree to have essentially 0% gross margins, an infinite number of us can keep reselling tokens to each other, can't we?
This is our new 20 VC scale SASTR demo day.
We all resell a million tokens to each other on the first week.
So everyone in batch 001 has a million ARR its first week because we just resold our tokens to each other.
The VCs don't mind.
You're exactly right.
And the sentence that you added in passing is the key one.
Until we all have to get profitable, all this can continue.
And then at some point, that's why I said, I think you're starting to see it.
Someone's going to have to say, assuming we want to have a net present value and a cash flow, what's going on here?
And then all this becomes more clear.
I didn't comment on the emergent labs fastest to 100 million.
Jason, you actually tried it, didn't you?
You thought it was good.
I did.
I thought, I mean, listen, it's hard for me to know the criticism, right?
You know, some folks in the press in the India B2B environment tried to make this some sort of scandal, right?
Because, and in a sense, fair enough, if you go to Emergent Labs, and Emergent Labs is sort of an Indian competitor, Replit and Lovable, which I'll show you what I learned in a minute, right?
And if you go right now to the homepage, they say zero to a hundred million, I think in eight months, it's right there.
It's the biggest banner.
In all fairness, if you're going to put yourself out there, not just as a tweet, but if it's going to be right there on your website, one would expect 70% to 80% accuracy in that number, ideally higher, right?
So if it's lower than that, I think it's fair that some daggers came out.
But I don't actually know what happened.
Is it triple counting?
I can tell you one thing that I learned, which I don't love.
And a lot of AI startups do this.
So this is not unique to Emergent.
Instead of getting used a free version, they try to get you to immediately do a free trial instantly that says it's $0 and $20 a month thereafter.
Now, so many folks do this.
It is not unique to them.
It's probably best practice in most accelerators.
But I'm pretty sure that means they recognize $240.
in ARR that first month when you're paying zero and they trick you because you don't even yeah you do have to click on the stripe link but you almost think you're just using the free product so is that if I do a zero dollar a month product that's discounted as a marketing cost and I churn after 30 days does that count as 240 dollars of ARR I think for a lot of startups it does So that's a fair criticism.
I'm not saying this is what Emergen did, but a lot of startups will instantly recognize that as $240 in ARR, which is how they rock it.
Otherwise, you can't get there that quickly, right?
So they clearly did that.
I will say what was interesting is overall, I think the criticism is probably unfounded because I thought the product was pretty good.
much better than Make, like an order of magnitude better than the disaster of Make.
Because I do a five-part test, a six-part test.
The first part is awareness test.
So I ask it to redo the saster.ai homepage.
Actually, of all the platforms, it did the best job.
It beat all of them, all of the leaders, because I redid this recently.
I redid it.
And they're all good at it, replicate, lovable, v0.
They're all good at it.
They all pass the test.
But it actually...
was probably the best and it passed a bunch of the other tests.
So I'm not going to switch to emergent labs, but I would say it's in the top 10% of vibe coding apps.
That's pretty good.
So that tells me it's a legit business.
Like they did, they did the work.
The truth is if you play with a lot of these, even from leaders, like makes not the only one that's crappy.
Okay.
Because they're basically relying on the fact that Claude code does 90% of the work for you, right?
They're just putting the simplest wrap around this.
And so.
They did a good job, but I really didn't like the way they do the billing, but we'd probably have to shoot half our portfolio companies that do PLGAI because I think it's a sus practice.
I just don't like tricking you with this $0 for the first month when you think you're using a free trial.
That's the sus part.
I don't love that kind of gray art, but the product's pretty good.
You know what I don't like when it comes to confusing?
I was wondering whether to go off on one in this show and then I thought, fuck it, let's go off on one.
It's been a long day.
I'm pissed off by these tranched rounds.
I see them all the freaking time.
The amount of Sequoia rounds where it's like, oh, X raises money from Sequoia at five billion.
Trust me, Sequoia got in at one.
But they just club it together and then announce the sum and then the latest valuation.
And it's just very misleading.
The tier ones get in early.
A tier two, tier three instantly marks it up.
Same as crypto, isn't it?
For years.
What's the difference?
We'll give the Andreessen Crypto Fund, you know, essentially 80% off the token.
It's the same thing, isn't it?
You're paying for the signal.
I think if you break it down.
First of all, just so everyone's on the same page, because interestingly, neither Claude nor GPT was on the same page and didn't know what a tranched round was.
And they gave the old conventional venture, tranched round based on performance milestones, you know, BS from back in the day when we actually ran businesses, right?
So didn't have a clue about this.
So let's be clear on the practice here.
The practice here is when a company, a hot company, raises a round where there are effectively two...
different prices per share, let's call it a first close and a second close, even if they're at or near contemporaneous, where the first one might be at 250 pre and the second one is at a billion pre and the headline is they always at a billion pre.
There's two impacts of this.
First, let's do the simple one where there's just a single participant in the round.
That's where if I'm the new investor, I want to pay 600.
The company wants a headline of a billion.
And to win the deal, someone says, OK, let me put some money in a 250, some money in at a billion.
I can do math because I'm paid to do math because I'm an investor.
So I know my overall basis is 600 million.
So I'm getting what I want.
And the company is getting what it's want, which is a headline number of a billion.
It's silly, but that's all that's happening in that case.
That's the single participant tranche deal.
If a company wants a headline, that's what they get.
Generally, those things come back to bite you because by definition, if you're the company, just as the investor can do, Matt, presumably you can do, Matt, if you accept that combined deal, you're implicitly saying, I know I'm only worth 600, but I'd like the optics of a billion.
You better be damn sure that your next round, you're at one and a half billion.
Otherwise, you'll have the optics of a down round.
And if you're an optics believer, that's probably worse than the uptick.
So that's kind of the single participant version.
The much more annoying...
version that Harry clearly was getting on his high horse about is when you have the same structure, but access to those rounds where the lead investor maybe does all of the 250 pre-round and only half of the billion round, and then some new investors just get to do the billion round.
So literally at the same time, the lead investor is investing at 600 billion and the follower investor, less marquee investor, is investing in the same asset at a billion.
And I don't believe there's right or wrong in money.
There's just money.
That's where, at the minimum, you have to look yourself in the mirror as the other investor and saying, wow, that's the price of being cool.
That's the price of access.
I'm paying 50% more because I just can't access that deal.
And that feels like a pretty invidious thing.
I mean, again, going back to the comment, if you think about, and again, trying to avoid morality and saying, oh, it would feel shitty.
I mean, you really would feel like a loser if you did that.
But let's play it out.
This is a situation where...
The lead investor, let's say it's Sequoia because everything good and strong should be Sequoia.
They are admitting it's only worth 600 on average, and they're just doing this fakie transaction.
The company is admitting it's only worth 600 on average because they're taking the money at a blended cost of 600.
So what you're saying doing at a billion is you're either saying either I have a lower cost of capital and I'm willing to take a lower return than everyone else, or the only positive spin you can come up with is the company thinks it's worth 600.
Sequoia thinks it's worth 600, but I am smart enough, even though I don't have access, I am smart enough and clever enough to know that it's really worth a billion and I should do it at a billion, even though I can't get to 600.
And I'm willing to put up with the upfront tax and foolishness look because six, 12 months from now, it'll be obvious that I bought at a great price and maybe I'll look like a genius.
Yeah, but we've entered an era though where...
So many founders are obsessed about headline prices, obsessed.
They're obsessed coming out of demo day.
They're obsessed once they cross a billion, which I think should be a moment to take a pause because of the M&A options.
They're obsessed about driving to 11 billion and 9 billion and one upping their competition.
And they don't think through any of the ramifications of the valuation they're hiring.
They don't care.
And I'm not even saying that's bad.
I mean, I think burning the bridges is a good way to have a big outcome.
It's become utterly gamified on many levels, right?
It's just become gamified.
And so this 11 teen tranches in a round is just part of gamifying it.
It's been true of YC since I started investing.
There was always a cheaper price before demo day, if you're reasonably hot, a higher price at demo day, and then a 20% or 30% after demo day.
So that version has just become institutionalized.
So be it if it's what the founders want.
If they want to gamify it, so be it, right?
I just don't think raising it 5 or 8 billion when you're at 80 million or 100 million of suspect ARR is the most exciting accomplishment in the world.
I'm going to send a few thumb emojis on the email, but that's about it.
It goes back to your point though on Emergent Labs and the graph doing the eight months to 100 million.
The gamification of like the race to 100 million.
I'm not choosing Emergent Labs.
Listen, I think they built a good product.
I think I'm sure they've been overly lambasted because whether it's 100 or 80 or 60, I don't care.
It's pretty damn good, right?
Whatever it is.
But if you're going to do that, you deserve the daggers to come out when it's not 100%, right?
I agree.
One that I thought was fantastic, exciting.
I always like to see a potential IPO.
or to IPO shortly.
I thought this was fascinating.
It's been an incredible journey, actually, from like, you know, Scandinavia, these founders building this business has had a couple of CEO changes.
The business is actually in incredible shape, both actually, and we announced today that they raised, I think it was 500 million at 10 billion fitness and health data.
Do you know what, actually, Rory, Jason's annoyingly right again.
I don't know if you remember his predictions, but he predicted, if I'm not wrong, that 2027 would be the year for human healthcare data and longevity.
Yes, and it looks like it might even be 2026.
And the great thing about both stories is Johnny Iverside, very defendable from, and this is not an AI envy story.
I mean, they use AI in what they do, but these are fundamentally standalone products with a clear consumer value proposition.
They're not going to be cloud-coded on Friday.
I totally see it.
And they clearly have had critical mass in terms of revenues.
I think it's awesome.
I think the question, listen, the interesting thing for these products, you know, going back to the topic of ARRR, these are recurring revenue products, right?
For the most part, right?
Fairly expensive subscriptions.
And they're exciting until like Peloton when they aren't, right?
Now, there's not a $2,000 cost here.
And I'm not being critical.
I think that they're exciting.
But there's also a faddishnessism.
People can switch.
What multiples do these companies deserve what it is?
I'm not smart enough to know, but the acceleration is a force of nature, right?
I'd love to be a seed investor.
Don't get me wrong.
Do you think there's a fattishness in the same way?
I think we ascribe- I think you can switch from- Harry, you're into fitness.
I'm not so much, but I run 360 days a year, five miles a day for 10 years.
So if they're a better treadmill, a better device, a better thing, I would switch.
You're fairly fit, Harry.
If you are or and you love it, but Whoop is better- And you care, you're going to switch.
So it's not service now, ARRR, right?
You're loyal, but there's just some disruption.
Like look at Peloton.
When Peloton blew up.
But actually, as the world changed, even though people love Peloton, right?
Super high MPS.
Remember the Peloton addicts of 2020 on Zoom?
They loved it.
But when the world changed, the simple answer to Peloton is they just switched.
And Whoop is different than Aura.
And there could be a Whoop or Whoop Aura.
And maybe one is your ankle and it has your AI rock from Johnny Ive in it and we'll switch.
Two comments on this.
One, disclosure, we are lucky enough to have a small investment in Aura.
Sure.
the acquisition of one of our companies.
So I don't have a ton of information, so I'm not going to breach any confidentialities, but just an abundance of caution, I'm not going to comment on numbers at all.
Great products, right?
But to your point, Jason, on it's not ARR-like service now, let me be direct.
Get the fuck over it.
Not every business on the planet has five-year design.
And if you're running a bar down the street, every night I can go drink at a different bar.
If you're selling Coca-Cola, every day I can switch to Pepsi.
If you're running Amazon, consumer...
Every day I can go and search and go on Walmart.
Not every business is going to have enduring kind of long-term lock-in.
And that's obviously, you'd prefer to have lock-in, but there are lots of business that have been around for 50 years where every day they have to earn the right for the consumer to go to them.
There's no doubt in my mind that any kind of consumer hardware, software combination product has some residual asset from the subscription.
But then, yeah, that every new device has to be awesome.
You're in competition with other awesome products.
It turns out capitalism is hard.
If you want to make $10 billion in value, you've got to deliver value for your consumers.
And I think for what it's worth on Peloton, I actually think what really happened to them, it's a little like the Zoom story, is demand that would have been wonderful.
It would have been the greatest stock ever had that demand been spread out over five or six years, increasing at 20% a year.
We'd be talking about the Peloton compounding machine.
Instead, everyone bought the damn thing at the same time.
They staffed up to meet that demand.
The market was...
wildly saturated.
And then the stock went down and broke the narrative.
So I do agree.
There's nothing you can do to make a market bigger than what it is.
But I think they got whiplash by virtue of the COVID demand spike followed by demand fall off.
The meta question for venture is, you know, the classic Peter Thiel zero to one competitions for losers.
is what Dr.
Thiel said.
Competitions for losers.
Competition destroys profits.
Monopolies drive innovation.
You want to invest in monopolies.
That's just my meta anxiety is if these are unmonopolizable markets, are they good ones for venture or not?
And obviously there's two sides to it, but I would feel more comfortable investing in things that become monopolies.
I mean, it's a better landing place than investing in bars.
And you can't ascribe the same durability of revenue to this as you can one day, as much as I love it.
But on the other hand, you can't ascribe super high growth and you can't ascribe big time.
Look, if there were enough monopolies to do even one good monopoly a year, I'd be in.
And speaking of the founders are about to get the all-time prize because they invested in the space monopoly and 20 years later, they're going to cash in their chips.
Monopolies are better businesses than competitive markets.
But I do think you can still build many billions of dollars of value from a high good consumer product.
And there are lots of prior examples of that.
And yet we all understand the dynamics of, I mean, actually for what it's worth, I think if you look at consumer products that flame out, like the GoPro, it's much less, and I'm doing this on the fly, but it's much less a competition issue.
It's not like GoPro died because the competitor to GoPro emerged, right?
It's that saturation is as big a problem as anything else.
Well, DG, I might disagree with you.
I mean, there was a whole step function in the industry that they got left behind, right?
Would you prefer $2 billion in consumer hardware revenue, $2 billion worth of five-year contracts like Palantir?
Yeah, I'll take the contracts with the 90% gross margin and the five-year lock-in, please.
Your starter for 10.
I think maybe the more interesting question, Rory, that you brought up.
Because so much has changed.
This is our 50th show.
So much has changed, right?
When we started this show, durable public company revenue, despite slowdown in the top line, was the gold standard, right?
It was the best revenue out there.
Fast forward to today, do we give a crap what type of R it is?
Because the durable software stuff is trading lower than the S&P 500.
Maybe I'd rather have ring revenue with a somewhat suspect customer lifetime value because the software value is so low.
Maybe I don't care where my R comes from.
Totally.
Right.
It used to matter.
It used to matter.
Right.
We were so we'd be in board meetings where you would torture companies so that they would have more ARR and that they would have less variable revenue.
I mean, that seems like archaic today.
Yeah.
And I remember doing that.
I remember telling people not to do that because I'm a big believer is you should sell your product the way the customer wants to buy it.
And I agree.
One of the things I hated about venture was when people say, oh, make it all recurring revenue.
And then the fun one that's actually really relevant right now is you remember everyone would say.
Oh, you know, it's a hardware product, but all the values in the software.
So we're really like a software company.
And now hilariously, everyone's going, oh, thank God I've got hardware because hardware is defensible, not software, right?
A big picture comment is you should conform your company around your customers and your model, not your VCs.
Because I agree with you, this kind of pretend it's AR, but then next year we hate AR.
It's just a total waste of time for entrepreneurs.
Things are what they are.
And you do best in business if you actually say what they are and just live and die by that.
Most consumer products have high volatility associated with them.
You better have a damn good R&D function and continue to build great products.
The one question I would have about an Aura IPO, just thinking about it, we looked today, this week they also talked about how I think Allbirds, was it acquired for less than $30 million?
Yeah, I was literally about to bring this up, Jason.
It was acquired by Almex for $39 million.
So my question is, if a company like Aura goes public and you see weakness in a quarter, should you dump this thing instantly like Allbirds versus forgive a little bit of weakness in a sales force or service?
Again, I'm going to avoid any specifics.
Genuine comment here, right?
But I would say something, unlike the other two guys, I've run a textile manufacturing company 30 years ago.
The technology required to make an all birds or a shoe is not the same as the technology required to make a modular electronic device that sits on the human finger and measures blood.
Either of these kind of consumer electronic products, they're not a monopoly in the same way NVIDIA is, but it's a pretty rare number of companies that can do that.
Go down, put it this way, Jason.
I'll name a wearable, you'll name a wearable, and then I'll name a sneaker and you'll name a sneaker.
We'll be done with wearables long before we're done with sneakers because there's a lot of different sneaker companies.
And yeah, it turns out sneakers are easier to make than wearables, which are easier to make than NVIDIA GPU chips.
Speaking of like, do we care?
What do we actually care about?
I don't know if you guys know this, but I have wonderful partners.
And one of my partners is much more intelligent than me, which Rory, you're going to make some form of gag about.
But he helped me put together some of the schedules too.
And he was like, whoa, I had no idea about this.
He was like, whoa, Epic Games laid off 25%.
I didn't even hear about that.
Yeah, and then I had Marc Andreessen on your last pod sort of laughing about how we all overhired in 2021.
Marc Andreessen was very clear.
He thought that we were all using AI as an excuse.
We were all overstaffed by 50 or at least 75%.
But point being, point completely under the radar.
And to be fair to them, they didn't try and do an AI bullshit story.
They basically said, you know, daily active use of their Fortnite game and their games is down.
So your revenue is down.
So you take your expenses down.
Struck me as a no bullshit layoff announcement.
It's like, you know, we sell less stuff.
We have less people.
It sucks.
You know, and again, I really do try never to be cavalier about people losing their jobs because every one of those has to put food on the table.
They're not earning the kind of money we're earning.
And now they got to go out and find another job in a shitty job market.
It sucks.
But the lesson is, and that's why I respect them.
It's like, we're selling less.
So we got to do what we got to do to keep the company profitable.
Guys, we keep talking about these layoffs and these big numbers.
I mean, it was over a thousand people laid off in this layoff.
A thousand.
Numbers are relatively meaningless.
And we've had so many of these conversations.
What happens to the labor markets?
Well, one thing on the Epic thing, and the Wall Street Journal did a good article on this this week on the permanent decline of Hollywood employment.
It's permanently in decline.
It's in decline because fewer movies and TV shows are being made.
TikToks and YouTubes are doing it.
And it's in permanent decline because every other country provides larger subsidies.
And so there's this permanent decline in Hollywood labor.
I think entertainment is sort of shows us the future.
Epic Games is entertainment too.
And they will absorb as much AI and technology as they can to adapt.
And it's just early.
It's just early.
They've had to adapt to YouTube.
They've had to adapt to social gaming.
We talk about these 1,000 people at last year or whatever, but I think Epic Games is just, I think it's a more interesting view of the future than block.
We talk about folks might vibe code a B2B app, but content's already being massively disrupted.
And some part of that is, as you pointed out to me when I got it wrong a few episodes back, AI related in terms of recommendation engines.
But I think a lot of it is just a very competitive attention economy.
You're right, Fortnite was the game everyone talked about.
Now it's not.
It's the nature of the gaming industry.
So yes.
It's the Fortnite circle coming for everybody at the end of the game.
Coming for everybody, even Fortnite.
The Fortnite circle has come to Fortnite itself.
It's surrounded itself.
Poor Epic Games is in the middle of its end game of Fortnite.
It's just it and content creators shooting it out at the very end.
It's coming for all of the Fortnite circles coming for all of us.
The other one that kind of relatively was, I think maybe a little bit overlooked is reports of Manus founders.
Manus obviously for contacts being bought by Meta recently.
Manus founders trapped or kept in China.
So just again, give people contacts and then put out one.
Question mark there.
Manus was a company originally based in China, had some Chinese investors, then we domiciled to Singapore, benchmark invested.
Effectively, we founded it as a US-Singapore company.
Meta acquired it.
I want to say, and I use the word past tense, acquired, because my understanding is the transaction's closed and the money's moved.
Though, interestingly, neither Chachi Pino and Tropic were clear on that, but my understanding is that's what happened.
But then now the latest thing is the Chinese government takes a dim view of this.
because they don't want Chinese talent leeching overseas and going to the US and effectively not being Chinese anymore.
And they feel it as a brain drain.
So they did something that was pretty coercive in the sense of two of the key founders of Manus, I think, were either in China or summoned to China.
They're no longer able to leave.
So those are the facts.
And yeah, of course you care.
I mean, I think that starting from scratch, I mean, that sucks.
I wish them the best because...
That's not a pleasant place to be.
I mean, I think you've had the Jack Maul thing of, you know, at Alibaba of effectively going, as it were, under the radar for a few years when you kind of incurred the displeasure of the administration.
You also have people who've had significantly worse consequences than that.
So let's start with the basic.
You wish them all the best.
I don't think another deal like this would happen to you.
I think this whole Singapore-Washington thing is over.
It's over.
I totally agree.
That's where it's going to go with that long preamble.
I'll tell you who did notice.
Maybe no one in America spent any time thinking about it.
every Chinese founder who was thinking about doing this is going, hmm, I don't know how I feel about this.
I don't know if I can do this deal.
I do know if I do this deal, I am never going home again.
But I'm with you, Jason.
I think all these other China-washing deals, they're put on pause or they're put on re-evaluation or this next thing is going to sound harsh.
It's a fairly coercive regime.
If your family is not out of the country, do you have exposure there?
It just shows, I mean, authoritarian governments can take pretty drastic steps to impact our citizenry if they want to.
And I agree, Jason, it makes it really hard to imagine doing another one of these deals without being worried about this consequence.
And hopefully they'll kind of go, nor do you pay 50%.
Like, you know, California makes it hard to leave too, but if you pay them 13%, they'll let you go to Nevada.
Yeah, hopefully it turns out to something like that.
And please God, it's not something more coercive.
But I agree, Jason, wouldn't do another one.
In venture, you take risk, right?
It's part of the job.
So we've all had deals where there's some rule, some corner that was cut and we talked ourselves into it's OK, right?
Something weird about this company, but and we convince ourselves as.
as talking to some mediocre lawyer or asking an LLM today that it's okay.
So like the Singapore washing must work.
They've moved to Singapore.
It's got to work.
And you convince yourself that you talk to a few people and you take the risk.
And it bounced, it appears to have bounced the right way for benchmarking friends, right?
It appears they've gotten their money, but you don't do the next one.
Right.
And there's 242 millionaires in Singapore.
The majority of the inflow is Chinese.
You don't do the next deal.
Maybe other capital does the deal.
And that's fine.
Right.
Capital is fungible.
But you just eventually just don't you just can't do the next one like this.
It's too risky.
What do you do if you're meta?
Part of the asset you're acquiring is the team.
Two billion is not a lot for meta.
And they have the product.
Yeah.
What are you going to do, Harry?
What would you recommend?
Getting angry at the Chinese?
That'll work well, right?
I mean, I think it'll be yet another acquisition that looked clever, but in retrospect, wasn't amazing.
Well, listen, for Meta, I'll just say one thing.
I only have a tiny bit of information, but it appears to me Madness is running mostly and smoothly as an application in a company now.
I don't know if the founders are working at it, you know.
Certainly feel strongly when you lose your founders, you lose your heart and soul of your company.
But in the short term, I don't think it's a big deal for Meta outside of the founders because it's running smoothly in the short term.
It's not down.
The team's functioning.
They're running.
But it's crazy.
and at the risk of being Pollyanna, but also wanting to assume the best of people.
I would hope that the meta management team and board, to the extent they do have any influence, can help these guys come to an amicable end.
And if it requires a tax settlement or whatever, you don't want to leave people you just acquired in limbo.
At some zoom out level, when you listen to the rhetoric on both capitals, you just have to realize that trying to tread between these two countries is pretty hard right now.
You know, we have China hawks in the U.S.
government.
They obviously have a whole ton of U.S.
hawks or whatever the equivalent is.
There's a real perception of competition.
You know, we don't let them buy the NVIDIA chips, et cetera, et cetera.
You're playing with fire on that thing.
And sometimes it bites you.
I just think overall, it's natural in given the outcomes in AI, given the growth that I think it's tied to taking the highest levels of risk we've also taken because the payoffs seem to be there.
And when this deal happened, folks.
kind of thought this was aggressive.
Benchmark's never done a deal like this.
Why are they doing a deal like this?
It's not even very cheap, right?
It seems a little crazy.
And they're like, well, we've never seen anything grow like this.
And the team's incredibly talented, right?
So they took a little bit of risk and they made their profit.
We're all taking more and more risks.
Folks, now it's a week of revenue at a demo day.
I did a million dollars my first week.
It's amazing.
What about the second week?
I don't know.
But as long as it all works out in the aggregate, and I think this...
Nobody cares, to Harry's point.
I cared about Manus.
I added it to the list.
I don't think anybody cares.
We're all focused on getting a million dollars our first week.
Just good realization that the worst thing that can happen is not just, oh, you lose your money.
There are worse outcomes than that.
I mean, speaking about cooling their shot on making billions of dollars, Steve Jervison.
He's tied his career to Elon very smartly, so that's not in any negative way in terms of the investments that he has.
Plowed, trebled, doubled, quadrupled, everything in between.
Leaves California, buys most expensive home in Incline Village.
And these were Jason's notes.
Will anyone with liquidity be left in California?
What if California is structurally bankrupt?
It's not a great sign when they keep leaving, is it?
It's not a positive.
But Rory's staying, Jason.
I mean, look, first of all, you're exactly right.
All credit to Steve and more power to him.
I've known him intermittently for 30 years.
He made a brilliant call to align with SpaceX, been on the board of Tesla and SpaceX.
Tesla for a while and then came off, obviously, for those back in the day.
But SpaceX too, yeah, he's put his money in a compounding machine and now he's clearly hit the DPI moment.
The truth is this, ultra high network people have a high degree of mobility.
And unfortunately, if you put the hammer up too high, They can leave and choose to go across the border to Incline Village and save 13% on any realized gains.
Plus, as we pointed out, 5% on all gains if this wealth tax passes.
You know, at the margin, why wouldn't you?
You know, it's not like you need to be in California to be a Tesla board member or a SpaceX board member, given they're down in Texas.
The actions have consequences.
Well, it's interesting also this week, Washington State did pass their 9.9% state income tax for millionaires.
And the governor said, well, they just deserve to pay more.
And that may well be true.
It may well be true.
Like, I don't want to debate that.
This is not political, right?
I'm more concerned about the tipping point when we kill golden geese.
Washington and California and to a lesser extent, New York have been the golden geese.
It's, you know, Washington said they're going to lose money.
They're not going to make money on this.
It appears that most folks that are neutral or right have said California will lose money on the billionaire tax.
Everyone's left.
And the tax itself assumed massive amounts from Larry Ellison, who's been gone a half decade.
Right.
So no one's it's just I do worry they're all leaving.
Everyone that doesn't work at open an anthropic, you know, on this show, we've done it 50.
And I said in the beginning of this that you leave after the series B.
And now I see that used again and again by these folks who are on the right on it.
They say all the founders will leave after the series B, but it may happen by show 100.
And I think one of the arguments I make is because, you know, the truth is this, articulating the argument to the activist on the other side as being you're being mean to the billionaires is of genuinely no interest.
And being mean to a billionaire is actually a feature.
But I think the real articulation is this.
you actually are losing revenue that won't be available to California.
And the marginal dollar in California probably goes into payment for homelessness, payment for your kids, payment for foster homes, payment for marginal social welfare services that are easy to defund when times are tough.
And by choosing to obtusely tax without any attention to ability to collect that money, you've actually reduced the revenue that's available to you.
And that's the argument you have to make to someone on the other side of the table.
You have literally chosen something.
Instead of getting, pick a number, 50 million from the Larry and Sergeys and the Jervisons of this world, you went for 200 million and now you're going to get zero.
And what that means in real terms is somewhere down the line, long after all these changes have been made, somewhere in Sacramento, someone will zero out a line item on the budget.
And let me give you a clue.
It won't be payments to the teachers.
It won't be payments to the firemen.
It'll be marginal services to marginal people that you're...
crass stupidity and desire to make a political point has ended up costing them money.
And that's the only argument that moves the needle because it's true.
And you're right, Jason, you're saying is that it will have a net negative return.
Now do you feel good?
Rory, if you were Steve, would you have left?
I think from my perspective...
I'm just so glad to be in California.
It's so wonderful.
I've moved around a lot early in my life.
I have my friends here.
I have my life here.
At the margin, the whole point of having money is to be able to do what you want.
And for three or four or five or even 13% of your income, do you really want to leave?
I will say that's why you can tax income relatively highly because it comes all the time and you can't control timing.
And therefore, you have to uproot your whole life for the rest of your life to avoid it.
And I don't think it's worth it.
So I wouldn't move to avoid income tax.
Conversely, if you have this pending capital event where literally in one year, you're going to sell, quote, all your SpaceX stock and realize a $2 billion gain.
And you're going to pay an extra 13% of that in California, just $260 million.
Maybe you turn to your wife and say, honey, for the next two years, why don't we live in Incline Village 165 days?
I'll pay for the plane.
We'll go back every week.
You won't lose contact with anyone.
And we will save $260 million.
And you go, hmm, that's real coin.
And that's the point about, that's not the life I live.
That's not the situation I'm in.
But that's the argument you make.
It's like, it's not crazy.
Is there any story that I haven't hit on, guys, that we should hit on?
I just have to bring up the Ron Conway, Matthew Prince one, because I highlighted that one on Twitter.
It was just the funniest thing in the world.
Do you want to provide some context?
Yeah, I don't know Ron Conway, but he's certainly viewed as one of the Silicon Valley gems, right?
Seed investor and so many leaders, always out there as an advocate everywhere.
Probably could have retired years ago, right?
Very founder centric.
And he wrote that he had helped Cloudflare navigate some very significant issues earlier in the day.
I think on Jack Altman's podcast.
Yeah, on Uncapped.
And they asked Matthew Prince, CEO of Cloudflare, the question he said, well, maybe I don't remember any of that.
And it's just, it's not, and he wasn't mean.
Matthew can be fairly sharp as Harry knows these days.
It wasn't meant mean.
The tweet was not mean.
He literally just meant, he couldn't remember.
getting any help from this beloved VC.
And I think it just said so much to me about VCs adding value, but also VCs thinking they add value.
VCs possibly adding a modest amount of value, but founders not really thinking that modest value was consistent with the bravado of the VC.
It just crystallized the whole value add idea to be in a single tweet.
It wasn't mean.
It's just, I don't remember any of, I don't remember Ron helping, but maybe he did.
Yeah, you're right, Jason.
I did.
And I think actually my bigger heart to your point is both to some extent are right.
We all want to have agency.
We all want to feel we help and want to be good people.
And you look and go, hey, I spent some of my time helping the CEO.
I feel I helped.
But from the company's perspective, they're founding a company.
They're doing a million things on one or two things on a...
10-year journey, you helped.
You remember that vividly.
They're like, dude, it just fades into the background of 100 things.
And you know better than me, Jason.
They have to do every day, right?
One of the proofs of this, an interesting way to check it is I often read business biographies and business stories of great companies, venture-backed companies, and how they're formed and what happened.
And you know what I notice in them?
Every single one of them, very few little mention of VCs.
If you just read them, you eyeball them, says, oh, that's a biography.
Yeah.
And they crop in and come out a couple of times.
Right.
And I think that's right, because realistically, in the journey of what's going on, the only significant things we've done, I said this before in the podcast, we put in the money and we put in more money when they need it.
We decide to hire or not hire and fire the CEO.
We agree the broad strategic direction.
And anything after that is at best an assist.
Right.
And if you read the biographies of businesses.
What you generally see is the only time the VCs come in is on some version of those.
And it's five pages of the journey early on, interspersed around 200 pages in the first five chapters.
And by the time they get to the IPO, it doesn't even rise to the level of the thing.
I was reading the OpenAI biography, a bunch of them recently, and that's just the way it is.
Microsoft, same thing.
And the VC can feel those five minutes of impact were amazing, and they feel really good about them, and you feel warm and fuzzy.
The only thing founders really remember for better or real is, oh my God, our backs were to the wall and no one would put in money and they put in money.
They remember that.
Sometimes they even forget that.
But to your point, Jason.
At least half the time they forget that.
If they forget that, they're definitely going to forget the time you made that phone call to help them connect with XYZ and that helped them do something because that's something that happens a hundred times a day.
No, you're right.
We're not the stars in the drama.
We're bit players who get well paid for our part.
Boys, as always, the most humbling 90 minutes of my week.
I have faith you'll get more.
You'll be humble tomorrow.
But before we leave you today...
I run 20BC Fund and I get this question from founders all the time.
Harry, I can't find a good .com.
Do you have a hookup?
Let me tell you now, the answer is always gonna be no.
I don't have a guy or gal for that.
I do have a recommendation though.
If you're building a tech startup, get a .tech domain.
Tech startup, .tech domain.
It couldn't be more simple or obvious.
As an investor, I appreciate founders who put thought into their branding.
When I see .tech in your name, it tells me right away that tech is at the core of your build.
It'll say that to your customers too.
A clean and sharp domain like .tech pays off in the long run.
Look at the companies using .tech.
Nothing.tech, 1x.tech, Aurora.tech, CES.tech, Ultra.tech, Alice.tech, Neon.tech, Blaze.tech, Pi.tech.
Great tech companies.
They all use the .tech domain.
These are my two cents.
If you're building a tech startup, don't overthink it.
Secure your .tech domain from any registrar of your choice.
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